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INTRODUCTION 
Ann-Marie Brege's parents established an irrevocable trust in 1985, with 
Ann-Marie as sole beneficiary.1 When Merrill Lynch Trust Co. took over as 
trustee years later, however, the trust's principal dropped sharply, losing over 
half its value in just a few years.2 Ann-Marie sued in Michigan probate court, 
alleging that Merrill Lynch had violated its legal duties in administering the 
trust.3 Since Ann-Marie was from New York and Merrill Lynch had its head­
quarters in New Jersey, Merrill Lynch had an apparently easy argument for 
* I would like to thank my Note Editor, Alicia Frostick, the rest of the Notes Office, in-
cluding Doug Chartier, Kamal Gahli, Christie Hammerle, Dana Kaersvang, and Tim Wyse, and 
everyone else on the Michigan Law Review Editorial Board for their insightful feedback and skillful 
editorial work. I would like to thank Judge George Caram Steeh of the Eastern District of Michigan 
and his staff, including Marcia Beauchemin, Jennie Breitmeyer, Josephine Chaffee, Jill Hart, and 
Mark Miller, for introducing me to the topic and helping me refine my thoughts and arguments. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support. 
I. Brege v. Merrill Lynch Trust Co., No. 04-71616, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2004). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 1-2. 
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diversity jurisdiction. 4 In an unremarkable tum of events, Merrill Lynch filed 
a notice of removal to federal district court. 5 
Ann-Marie didn't take Merrill Lynch's removal sitting down. She filed a 
motion to remand to state probate court, arguing, inter alia, that the federal 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the probate exception to 
federal jurisdiction. 6 Merrill Lynch was taken aback-no court, Merrill 
Lynch argued, had ever applied the probate exception to a case that didn't 
involve a will, estate, or some equivalent substitute. 7 The federal court 
brushed Merrill Lynch's argument aside and instead followed a line of case 
law that looks to the jurisdiction of probate courts under state law to deter­
mine the extent of the probate exception. 8 Finding that Michigan gave its 
probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving the administra­
tion of trusts, the court granted Ann-Marie's motion to remand. 9 
Even those familiar with the probate exception may be surprised at this 
outcome. At its core, the probate exception stands for the proposition that 
federal courts do not have the authority to probate wills or administer es­
tates. 1 0 While the probate exception has expanded to include matters outside 
of pure probate, '1 the administration of a trust, established by still-living 
parents, is far removed from pure probate matters involving wills and es­
tates. At first glance, it is difficult to see how this doctrine could have so 
much strength and flexibility to limit federal subject matter jurisdiction, a 
generally rigid and inflexible doctrine.1 2 
The probate exception is rooted in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Among 
other things, the Act granted the lower federal courts jurisdiction over "all 
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dis­
pute exceeds . . .  five hundred dollars, and . . .  the suit is between a citizen of 
the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State. "1 3 In early 
cases, the Supreme Court interpreted this language to mean that federal 
courts could hear cases that, in 1789, were under the jurisdiction of English 
courts of common law and equity.1 4 But wills, the Court held, were under the 
4. Id. at 2. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 2-3. 
7. Id. at 4. 
8. Id. at 3-5. 
9. Id. at 5; accord Lepard v. NBD Bank, 384 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2004). 
IO. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946). 
11. See, e.g., O'Callaghan v. O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89, 110 (1905) (holding that federal courts 
should not hear a claim "ancillary to the original probate"). 
12. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("[The federal judici­
ary] ha[s] no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that 
which is not given."). 
13. I Stat. 73, 78 (1789). 
14. See, e.g., In re Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21Wall.) 503, 511-12 (1875); see also Mark­
ham, 326 U.S. at 494. 
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jurisdiction of English ecclesiastical courts, and thus federal courts could 
not hear probate matters.15 Federal courts have held that the probate excep­
tion survived even through a change in the language of Congress's statutory 
grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts.16 
Today, it is well settled that federal courts may not hear pure probate 
matters, i.e., questions of probating a will or administering an estate.17 
Courts have more trouble, however, determining the outer reach of the pro­
bate exception. The federal circuit courts of appeals apply three different 
tests to detennine the boundaries of the exception: the "nature-of-the-claim" 
test, the "route" test, and the "practical" test.18 
The most common test among the federal circuits is the "nature-of-the­
claim" test.1 9 This test focuses on the potential claim's effects on a past, cur­
rent, or impending state probate proceeding. Generally, courts applying the 
nature-of-the-claim test will entertain claims "if their resolution will not 
undercut the past probate of a will or result in the federal court assuming 
general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in the custody 
of the state court."2° Courts applying this test generally construe the probate 
exception quite narrowly.21 
A sizable minority of circuits use the "route" test.22 This test looks to 
state law to detennine the extent of the probate exception. Federal courts 
15. See, e.g., Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 511-12; see also Markham, 326 U.S. at 
494. 
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2004) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . .  and is be­
tween (I) Citizens of different States .. . .  ")(emphasis added); Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate 
Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1479, 1500 & n.113 (2001). 
17. Markham, 326 U.S. at 494 ("[A] federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or 
administer an estate .... "). 
18. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has not considered the 
probate exception in any published case since the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 
1970. 
19. For the sake of convenience, this Note adopts the labels used by Professor Peter Nicolas 
to designate the various tests. See Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1488-90. 
Five circuits have adopted the nature-of-the-claim test. See Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 
(2d Cir. 2002); Golden v. Golden, 382 F.3d 348, 358-59 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding also that a state 
may narrow the scope of the probate exception by assigning ancillary matters to state courts of 
general jurisdiction); Breaux v. Dilsaver, 254 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2001); Marshall v. Marshall, 
392 F.3d 1118, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2004 ); Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, 922 F.2d 666, 672-73 (I I th 
Cir. 1991). Two other circuits appear to have applied the nature-of-the-claim test in their most recent 
probate exception decisions but did not explicitly adopt a test. See Mangieri v. Mangieri, 226 F.3d l ,  
2-3 ( lst Cir. 2000) (citing cases applying the nature-of-the-claim test and the practical test but gen­
erally applying the nature-of-the-claim test); Sianis v. Jensen, 294 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(citing cases applying the nature-of-the-claim test and the route test but generally applying the na­
ture-of-the-claim test). 
20. Golden, 382 F.3d at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21. See, e .g . ,  Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 672. 
22. Three circuits have adopted the route test. See Turja v. Turja, 118 F.3d 1006, 1009 (4th 
Cir. 1997); Lepard v. NBD Bank, 384 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2004); Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 
1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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will not hear claims that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of state probate 
courts under state law.23 In certain states, therefore, courts applying the route 
test construe the probate exception quite expansively.2 4 
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a "practical" test.25 Using this practical 
test, federal courts in the Seventh Circuit determine whether a matter is an­
cillary to probate-and thus within the scope of the probate exception-by 
determining the extent to which hearing the matter would impair the excep­
tion's policy justifications.26 These justifications include judicial economy, 
relative expertness, and, to a lesser extent, legal certainty. 27 
Professor Peter Nicolas has suggested a fourth test. Professor Nicolas 
argues that the historical justifications for the probate exception are gener­
ally inaccurate, and thus federal courts should entertain claims that establish 
a justiciable Article III case or controversy and do not concern property al­
ready within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state court in in rem or quasi in 
rem proceedings.28 This test construes the probate exception even more nar­
rowly than the nature-of-the-claim test. 
Entirely distinct from any consideration of probate matters, federal 
courts have also developed a complex doctrine of abstention. In these cases, 
the court indisputably has jurisdiction over the suit; for prudential reasons, 
however, the court dismisses or stays the proceeding.29 Courts have devel­
oped three categories of abstention doctrine, as well as a number of cases 
that do not fit in the three categories but rely on the same principles.3 0 
Burford abstention stands for the proposition that federal courts should 
dismiss cases in deference to comprehensive and complex state regulatory 
23. See, e.g., Rienhardt, 164 F.3d at 1300 (''The standard for determining whether federal 
jurisdiction may be exercised is whether under state law the dispute would be cognizable only by 
the probate court.") (quoting McKibben v. Chubb, 840 F.2d 1525, 1529 (10th Cir. 1988)). The term 
"jurisdiction" here indicates both the power of a court to entertain a certain type of dispute and the 
power to order a certain type of remedy. See id. at 1300 (noting that application of the route test 
depends on the remedies available in state probate courts); cf Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998) (noting that it is "commonplace" for the term ·�urisdiction" to 
encompass the remedial powers of a court). 
24. See, e.g., Lepard, 384 F.3d at 237 (holding that the district court properly declined to 
hear a claim involving the administration of a trust because such claims were within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the probate courts under Michigan law). 
25. See Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2003); Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 
714-15 (7th Cir. 1982). 
26. See Dragan, 679 F.2d at 715-16. 
27. See Storm, 328 F.3d at 944; Dragan, 679 F.2d at 714-15. 
28. Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1540-46. 
29. See ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 761-63 (4th ed. 2003). 
30. Commentators organize different abstention cases into different categories. See CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 325 n.3 (6th ed. 2002) ("[T]he Supreme 
court, the lower courts, and the commentators differ on how many abstention doctrines there are. 
Respectable support can be found for classifying the cases into two, three, four, or five categories. 
The number is of little significance, since the division is a mere organizational convenience."). The 
three categories presented here are commonly used and other commonly-cited cases are included. 
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programs addressing a distinctly local issue.31 The Supreme Court has only 
applied Butford abstention in the context of state-regulated industries.32 The 
doctrine applies only to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.33 
Younger abstention began with the principle that, absent special circum­
stances, federal courts should abstain in favor of ongoing state criminal 
proceedings when asked to find a state criminal statute or prosecution un­
constitutional. 34 The Supreme Court famously based Younger abstention on 
"Our Federalism," a policy of comity, respect, and noninterference in state 
court proceedings.35 The Supreme Court has expanded the doctrine to civil 
cases where the state government is a party or involving important state in­
terests.36 The Court has even applied Younger abstention in the absence of an 
ongoing state proceeding.37 
P ullman abstention requires a federal court to abstain when there is an 
unclear question of state law that could be dispositive, and the court's other 
option is to rule on a sensitive and unsettled constitutional question.38 The 
court stays the federal proceeding while the parties submit the unclear state 
law question to a state court.39 If a state court refuses to rule on the issue 
31. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. S. Ry. 
Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 780-85. In Burford, for example, Sun 
Oil Company filed suit in federal court alleging diversity jurisdiction and attacking the validity of a 
Texas Railroad Commission order granting Burford a permit to drill oil wells in a certain oil field. 
Burford, 319 U.S. at 316-17. The Court found that under Texas law, the Railroad Commission had 
the responsibility to regulate the entire oil field as a cohesive whole, an especially difficult task with 
distinctly local economic and environmental effects. Id. at 318-20. Texas established a system of 
specialized judicial review of Commission orders, with initial appeals lodged in one specific district 
court and subsequent appeals through normal state appellate channels. Id. at 325. The Supreme 
Court held that under these circumstances, federal courts should abstain, stating: 
The State provides a unified method for the formation of policy and determination of cases by 
the Commission and by the state courts. The judicial review of the Commission's decisions in 
the state courts is expeditious and adequate. Conflicts in the interpretation of state law, dan­
gerous to the success of state policies, are almost certain to result from the intervention of the 
lower federal courts. On the other hand, if the state procedure is followed from the Commis­
sion to the State Supreme Court, ultimate review of the federal questions is fully preserved 
here. 
Id. at 333. 
32. See Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1532. 
33. Id. 
34. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
29, at 795-836. 
35. I, 401 U.S. at 44. 
36. See, e.g. , Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (applying Younger abstention to child 
protection proceedings); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (applying the doctrine to a state 
department's suit to recover fraudulently obtained welfare benefits); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 
U.S. 592 ( 1975) (applying the doctrine to a nuisance suit brought by local officials against an adult 
theater); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 817. 
37. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (reversing a lower court's structural injunction 
against a local police department as an unwarranted intrusion on official discretion). 
38. See, e.g., R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally CHEMERIN­
SKY, supra note 29, at 763-75. 
39. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 763-75. 
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because the suit is stayed in a federal court, the federal court must dismiss 
the suit.40 
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have also abstained in a 
number of other cases that do not fit neatly into these three categories. For 
example, the Supreme Court held that abstention was required in Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux,41 a diversity case concerning the relative 
eminent domain powers of the state and local governments, an important 
and unsettled issue of state sovereignty.42 In Colorado River Water Conser­
vation District v. United States,43 a suit involving water rights, the Court 
found abstention appropriate because, among other things, abstention would 
avoid piecemeal litigation, the state forum would be more convenient for the 
over one thousand named parties, the comprehensive state court proceedings 
were already underway, and there had been no significant proceedings in 
federal court.44 Lower courts have abstained in a variety of cases, including 
cases involving probate matters, citing such justifications as relative exper­
tise, judicial economy, high state interest, and federalism.45 
This Note argues that federal courts, informed by abstention principles, 
should use the route test to determine the boundaries of the probate excep­
tion. Part I argues that the probate exception is best understood as a category 
of abstention doctrine. Part I contends that this understanding is consistent 
with both the probate exception's historical roots and the modern practice of 
federal courts. Part II argues that the route test best captures the probate ex­
ception as abstention. Part II illustrates that the route test reflects better than 
any other existing test the historical background, modem developments in 
relevant areas of law, and the prudential justifications for the probate excep­
tion as abstention. Part II also details how courts applying the route test can 
appropriately limit the expansion or contraction of the probate exception. 
I. THE PROBATE EXCEPTION AS ABSTENTION 
This Part argues that the probate exception is best understood as a cate­
gory of abstention doctrine. Section I.A demonstrates that jurisdiction over 
probate matters in pre-1789 English courts was a flexible doctrine akin to 
modem abstention doctrine, a model that early Supreme Court cases 
adopted and expanded. Section LB argues that the modem practice of fed­
eral courts also mirrors abstention doctrine, with similar practices and 
justifications. 
40. Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1975). 
41. 360 U.S. 25 ( 1959). 
42. Id. at 26. 
43. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
44. Id. at 80 I. Colorado River Water has since been largely limited to its facts. See Moses H. 
Cone Mem'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 19-28 (1983). 
45. See Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1538. 
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A. Historical Roots 
A careful look at the historical roots of the probate exception reveals that 
it resembles abstention doctrine more than hard and fast jurisdictional rules. 
Section l.A.1 demonstrates that the division of labor among English courts 
for probate matters most closely resembled modern abstention doctrine. 
Section l.A.2 maintains that the practice of early American courts also re­
sembled abstention doctrine, building and expanding on the practices of 
their predecessor English courts. 
1. The English Courts 
To the extent the Judiciary Act of 1789 adopted the division of labor of 
the English courts for probate matters, it adopted more of a prudential ab­
stention doctrine than clear jurisdictional lines. Though ecclesiastical courts 
had the power to probate wills,46 their jurisdiction was a matter of privilege, 
not a matter of right. As one English court explained: 
The common law is the most ancient, general, and fundamental law of the 
land. And the privileges of the church derive themselves only from the in­
dulgence and favour of princes; and they had no foundation in the ancient 
common law .... And although the privileges of the church are confirmed 
by divers acts of parliament, that hinders not but that there was an ancient 
common law, in which they had no bottom.
47 
Thus common law jurisdiction remained, even over matters generally heard 
by ecclesiastical courts.4 8 
Since the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was by privilege, their 
jurisdiction did not prevent courts of law and equity from exercising con­
current jurisdiction or intervening in matters otherwise properly before 
ecclesiastical courts.49 While courts of equity generally did not allow a suit 
against the executor of a will before probate, for example, the courts 
made exceptions in certain cases where the executor's misconduct or the 
protection of the property was at issue50 or when wills created trusts.51 
Courts of equity also exercised jurisdiction to set aside the probate of a will 
46. See, e.g., 2 R.S. DONNISON ROPER & HENRY HOPLEY WHITE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF LEGACIES 1790-91 (2d ed. 1848). 
47. Protector v. Ashfield, 145 Eng. Rep. 381, 382 (1656). 
48. Cf Thomas H. Dobbs, The Domestic Relations Exception is Narrowed After Anken­
brandt v. Richards, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1147 (1993) ("[S]ince the jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical courts was not of right, it also was not exclusive."). 
49. Cf Anthony B. Ullman, Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdic­
tion, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 1824, 1834-39 (1983) (detailing similar English court practices in 
domestic relations cases). 
50. See ROPER & WHITE, supra note 46, at 1796-98 (describing examples of such excep­
tions). 
51. See 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 1155, at 461 
(5th ed. 1941 ). 
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in certain circumstances.52 As for administration of estates, the ecclesiastical 
courts and courts of equity exercised concurrent jurisdiction, but a court of 
law would defer to an ecclesiastical court that was already administering the 
estate. 53 And even this division of labor changed over time, as courts of eq­
uity increasingly took steps to limit the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts 
over the administration of estates during the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­
turies. 5 4 
This division of labor among the English courts resembled modern ab­
stention doctrine more than rigid jurisdictional rules.55 The English courts of 
law and equity deferred to ecclesiastical courts despite retaining jurisdic­
tion, 56 just as federal courts today abstain in favor of state courts despite 
having proper subject matter jurisdiction.57 The courts of law and equity 
looked to the scope of the ecclesiastical courts' jurisdiction and available 
remedies in deciding whether to defer or not,58 just as federal courts look to 
the jurisdiction of and remedies obtainable in state courts in deciding 
whether to abstain.59 And the English courts at least implicitly took into ac­
count such principles as relative expertise, as courts of equity deferred to the 
specialized ecclesiastical courts, and judicial economy, as courts generally 
deferred to a court that was already hearing a case.w These principles weigh 
heavily in modern abstention doctrine.61 
2. The Early American Courts 
The practice of early American courts also resembled abstention doc­
trine. From the outset, the Supreme Court interpreted the probate exception 
to include matters beyond those over which the English ecclesiastical courts 
52. See Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1505-08 (describing examples of such circumstances). 
53. ROPER & WHITE, supra note 46, at 1793; Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1509, 1511 n.181. 
54. Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1510. 
55. Cf id. at 1520 ("[E]ven if one accepts the use of historical English practice as a guide, 
the scope of the probate exception is much narrower than many courts and commentators have as­
sumed."). 
56. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
57. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
58. See In re Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21Wall.) 503, 512 (1875) (stating that it was "settled 
law in England" that a court of equity "will not entertain jurisdiction of questions in relation to the 
probate or validity of a will which the ecclesiastical court is competent to adjudicate. It will only act 
in cases where the latter court can furnish no adequate remedy."); see also supra note 53 and ac­
companying text. 
59. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (stating that a necessary prerequisite 
for Younger abstention is "the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state 
tribunal the federal issues involved."); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (stating that one of 
the reasons for the "longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court 
proceedings " is the basic doctrine that "courts of equity should not act ... when the moving party 
has an adequate remedy at law .... "); supra text accompanying notes 31-44. 
60. See ROPER & WHITE, supra note 46, at 1793. 
61. See, e.g., supra notes 35, 45 and accompanying text. 
October 2005) Abstention and the Probate Exception 139 
exercised exclusive jurisdiction.62 Building off of the practice of their Eng­
lish predecessors, American jurisdictions developed their own unique 
division of labor for probate matters. Most of the colonies and early states 
created specialized courts to handle probate matters.63 Just as the jurisdiction 
of English ecclesiastical courts changed over time, however, the scope of 
probate court jurisdiction in the various states evolved-for example, to in­
clude exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of estates64 and over 
wills involving real property.65 The Supreme Court followed suit, holding 
that the probate exception extended to those matters newly within the exclu­
sive jurisdiction of state probate courts.66 
Some early Supreme Court cases explicitly recognized the role state 
courts played in determining whether federal courts could hear a matter. In 
In re Broderick's Will, the Court noted that California had expanded the ju­
risdiction of its probate courts to include both wills of personal estate and 
real estate, whereas English ecclesiastical courts exercised exclusive juris­
diction over only wills of personal estate.67 But the Court held that a federal 
court could not hear a claim to set aside a will involving real estate because 
"that was a question entirely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the 
Probate Court."68 In Ellis v. Davis, the Court carefully detailed the changing 
jurisdiction of probate courts among the states6 9 and held that a federal court 
could not hear the claim at issue because plaintiff had an adequate remedy at 
law under the existing jurisdiction of the probate court.70 And in Gaines v. 
Fuentes, the Court declared that a state could effectively eliminate the pro­
bate exception by vesting its courts of general jurisdiction with jurisdiction 
over probate matters, giving concurrent jurisdiction over probate matters to 
the federal courts.71 
62. As explained above, supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text, the jurisdiction of Eng­
lish ecclesiastical courts was a matter of privilege, not a matter of right. Thus when this Note states 
that English ecclesiastical courts "exercised exclusive jurisdiction" over a certain set of claims, it 
means that English ecclesiastical courts were the only courts that exercised jurisdiction over that set 
of claims as a matter of practice, not as a matter of right. 
63. See Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1514-18. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. at 1519. 
66. See Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 25 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("This court has in 
repeated instances expressly said that the probate of wills and the administration of estates do not 
belong to the jurisdiction of the Federal courts under the grant of jurisdiction contained in the Judi­
ciary Act . ... "); In re Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 515, 517 (1875) (holding that a 
federal court could not set aside a will even though it would not have been exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of the English ecclesiastical courts). 
67. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 515 (1875). 
68. Id. at 517. 
69. 109 U.S. 485, 494-97 (1883). 
70. Id. at 503. 
71. 92 U.S. at 21 ("But that [probate] jurisdiction may be vested in the State courts of equity 
by statute is there recognized, and that, when so vested, the Federal courts, sitting in the States 
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The overall thrust of early Supreme Court probate exception jurispru­
dence most closely resembled abstention doctrine. By expanding the scope 
of the exception beyond a strict reading of the English division of labor,72 
the Court shook loose of its own statutory rationale for the exception-i.e., 
the interaction between the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the practice of English 
courts. Prudential reasons remained as the only justifications for the bounda­
ries of the probate exception.73 Furthermore, the Supreme Court regularly 
looked to state court jurisdiction to help determine the scope of the excep­
tion. 74 This combination of prudential justifications and a look to state court 
jurisdiction is a defining characteristic of abstention doctrine. 75 Moreover, 
on at least one occasion, the Court explicitly affirmed the flexible, absten­
tion-like nature of the probate exception, stating that jurisdiction over 
probate matters was "neither included in nor excepted out of the grant of 
judicial power to the courts of the United States."76 
where such statutes exist, will also entertain concurrent jurisdiction in a case between proper par­
ties."). 
72. See supra notes 63-7 1 and accompanying text. 
73. Cf. Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 7 1 2, 7 1 3-14 (7th Cir. 1982). In Dragan, Judge Posner 
detailed the "shoddy" historical underpinnings of the probate exception. Id. at 713. Rather than 
refuse to follow it, however, Judge Posner concluded that the probate exception would not have 
continued "without a better reason than that it may have been implicit in the first judiciary act" and 
went on to analyze the case at hand in terms of the prudential justifications for the probate excep­
tion. Id. at 714-15; cf. Fuentes, 92 U.S. at 2 1  ("[W]hatever the cause of the establishment of this 
doctrine originally, there is ample reason for its maintenance in this country, from the full jurisdic­
tion over the subject of wills vested in the probate courts, and the revisory power over their 
adjudications in the appellate courts."). 
74. See supra notes 67-7 1 and accompanying text. Some other early Supreme Court cases 
stated that state laws should have no bearing on federal court jurisdiction. See e.g., Hess v. Rey­
nolds, 1 1 3 U.S. 73, 77 (1885); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 429-30 ( 1 868). But abstention 
cases often contain similar statements. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New 
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) ("[T]he federal courts' obligation to adjudicate claims within 
their jurisdiction" is "virtually unflagging.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Colo. River Water 
Conserv. Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 8 1 7  ( 1976) ("Generally, as between state and federal courts, 
the rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the 
same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction . . . .  ") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Those early probate exception cases are helpful in delineating the boundaries of the exception, but 
not in determining whether the exception is properly considered a category of abstention doctrine or 
a rigid jurisdictional rule. 
75. See, e.g., Colo. River Water, 424 U.S. at 817- 1 9  (listing prudential justifications for 
abstention in the case at hand and noting the concurrent jurisdiction of the state court); Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 ( 197 1 )  (describing the adequacy of state Jaw remedies, comity, and "Our 
Federalism" as factors counseling federal courts to abstain from enjoining pending state proceed­
ings); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 3 1 9  U.S. 3 1 5, 333-34 ( 1943) (describing the "expeditious and 
adequate" nature of the state system and the threat federal court intervention posed to the success 
state policies as factors requiring abstention); Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1538-39 (listing principles 
courts cite in abstaining). 
76. Ellis V. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883); cf. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.92[3] (3d ed. 2005) ("The probate exception is not a 'hard and fast' 
jurisdictional rule."). The Ellis Court also explicitly noted that the respective powers of the various 
courts continued to evolve: 
It has often been decided by this court that the tenns "law" and "equity," as used in the Consti­
tution, although intended to mark and fix the distinction between the two systems of 
jurisprudence as known and practised at the time of its adoption, do not restrict the jurisdiction 
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Looking at the probate exception through the lens of abstention also 
harmonizes early Supreme Court precedents. Many commentators have ef­
fectively demonstrated that the early Court's probate exception 
jurisprudence did not reflect the stated historical justifications for the excep­
tion77-that is, that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not exclude from federal 
jurisdiction many of the matters that the Court excluded through its probate 
exception jurisprudence. Most have reacted by assuming the primacy of the 
jurisdiction model and the historical rationale but asserting a more accurate 
view of history, arguing that the Court should overrule its precedents and 
narrow the probate exception considerably.78 Yet the probate exception has 
endured for over two hundred years, a considerable time for nothing more 
than a historical rnistake.79 Viewing the probate exception as abstention sug­
gests a different perspective entirely-English court probate practice 
resembling abstention provided the base as well as the catalyst for the 
proper development of a practice of federal court abstention in probate mat­
ters. 80 This perspective allows a principled approach to the probate exception 
without throwing aside stare decisis. 
B. Modern Practice 
The similarities between the probate exception and abstention doctrine 
continue to this day. Section l.B.1 maintains that the Supreme Court's most 
recent probate exception decision reaffirmed the parallels between the pro­
bate exception and abstention doctrine. Section l.B.2 demonstrates that the 
three tests adopted by the federal circuit courts of appeals bear distinctive 
characteristics of abstention practices. 
conferred by it to the very rights and remedies then recognized 'and employed, but embrace as 
well not only rights newly created by statutes of the States ... but new forms of remedies to be 
administered in the courts of the United States, according to the nature of the case, so as to 
save to suitors the right of trial by jury in cases in which they are entitled to it, according to the 
course and analogy of the common law. 
Ellis, 109 U.S. at 497. 
77. See Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1499-1520; see also supra notes 63-71 and accompanying 
text; cf Barbara Ann Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled 
Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571,  584-89 (1 984) (detailing similar historical inaccura­
cies in the Supreme Court's domestic relations exception jurisprudence); Dobbs, supra note 48, 
1147-49 (same). 
78. See Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1 546-47; cf Atwood, supra note 77, at 627-28 (reaching 
similar conclusions regarding the domestic relations exception). 
79. Cf supra note 73. 
80. Cf Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 1 7  U.S. 706, 7 1 7  ( 1996) ("Our longstanding ap­
plication of these [abstention] doctrines reflects 'the common-law background against which the 
statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted.'") (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of 
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1 989)). 
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1. The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court's most recent probate exception decision, Markham 
v. Allen,
81 retained the distinctions developed by early Court decisions that 
resembled abstention practices. While the Markham Court again recited that 
the probate exception arose out of the jurisdictional grant of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, which incorporated the practice of English courts,82 it stated 
without qualification that a federal court could not "probate a will or admin­
ister an estate."83 Thus, the Court reaffirmed that federal courts could not 
hear a broad range of cases, extending beyond the matters barred by strict 
adherence to the division of labor of eighteenth-century English courts.84 
Furthermore, the Markham Court acknowledged that abstention plays a 
role in the probate exception context. After holding that the federal district 
court had jurisdiction over the claims at issue, the Court next considered 
whether the district court should abstain.85 Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that a specific Congressional statute applicable to the petitioner, the Alien 
Property Custodian, precluded abstention absent prudential interests beyond 
the mere application of state law.86 Markham's analysis nonetheless suggests 
that the Court recognized that the probate exception implicates abstention 
concerns. 
2. The Circuit Courts 
The three probate exception tests adopted by the federal circuit courts of 
appeals are best understood as abstention practices, as they similarly look to 
the jurisdiction and remedies of the state courts, rely on prudential consid­
erations, and incorporate the distinctions developed by the Supreme Court 
that resemble abstention doctrine more than rigid jurisdictional rules. The 
narrowest test of the three, the nature-of-the-claim test, still bears elements 
characteristic of abstention. Like the other two tests, it accepts the absten­
tion-like distinctions of Markham and the early Supreme Court decisions. 
81. 326 U.S. 490 (1946). Markham, the Alien Property Custodian, filed suit in federal court 
against an executor and six claimants, seeking a judgment that Markham, as the Custodian, was 
entitled to the entire net estate. Id. at 492-93. The Alien Property Custodian is a federal official 
"empowered to receive all money and property in the United States due or belonging to an enemy, 
or ally of enemy, which may be paid, conveyed, transferred, assigned, or delivered to said custodian 
under the provisions of [the Trading with the Enemy Act]." 50 U.S.C. app. § 6 ( 1990). The Supreme 
Court found that Markham's suit "le[ ft] undisturbed the orderly administration of decedent's estate" 
and was "not an exercise of probate jurisdiction or an interference with property in the possession or 
custody of a state court." Markham, 326 U.S. at 495. 
82. Id. at 494 ("It is true that a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or adminis­
ter an estate, the reason being that the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and 
§ 24 (I) of the Judicial Code, which is that of the English Court of Chancery in 1789, did not extend 
to probate matters."). 
83. Id. 
84. See supra Section l.A.2. 
85. Markham, 326 U.S. at 495. 
86. Id. at 492, 496. 
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Moreover, the nature-of-the-claim test often requires courts to look to state 
court jurisdiction and remedies, much as do the traditional categories of ab­
stention. For example, under this test, courts hold that a case falls within the 
probate exception if the plaintiff's claim undercuts the past probate of a 
will.87 This requires courts to look to the scope of the state court proceeding 
and determine what claim or claims would undercut that proceeding, much 
as courts applying Younger abstention must look to the scope of ongoing 
state proceedings88 and courts applying Bwford abstention must look to the 
scope and complexity of state regulatory proceedings.89 
The route test resembles abstention doctrine even more closely than 
does the nature-of-the-claim test. Since federal courts applying the route test 
will not hear claims that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of state probate 
courts under state law,90 they explicitly look to state court jurisdiction-and, 
accordingly, to state court remedies-and at least implicitly incorporate 
prudential concerns such as comity, legal certainty, judicial economy, and 
relative expertise of courts. 9 1 In much the same way, courts applying 
Younger abstention explicitly defer to certain ongoing state proceedings,92 
courts applying Burford abstention look to the jurisdiction of complex state 
regulatory proceedings and the prudential concerns implicated,93 and courts 
abstaining in cases that do not fit inside the three abstention categories look 
to the interaction of state court proceedings and similar prudential con-
94 cerns. 
And even more so than the route test, the practical test almost com­
pletely abandons the jurisdiction model of the probate exception in favor of 
prudential concerns similar to those raised by traditional abstention doctrine. 
The practical test primarily focuses on judicial economy, relative expertness, 
and legal certainty,95 concerns which require courts applying this test to look 
to the jurisdiction and experience of state courts as a secondary matter.96 
87. See supra notes 1 9-2 1 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
91. See, e.g., Brege v. Merrill Lynch Trust Co., No. 04-7 1 6 1 6, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D. Mich. 
July 20, 2004) ('The development of the exception since Markham reflects respect for state spe­
cialty court jurisdiction and primary regard for practical concerns such as legal certainty, judicial 
economy, and relative expertise of courts. The substantially similar tests the Fourth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits have developed incorporate these concerns by looking to the jurisdiction of probate 
courts under state law in determining the extent of the probate exception.") (citations omitted). 
92. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra notes 42--45 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
96. See Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 7 1 5  (7th Cir. 1 982) ('The force of the considerations 
will vary from state to state depending on particular judgments made by each state and incorporated 
in its probate laws."). 
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Similar prudential concerns and practices animate the entire field of absten­
tion doctrine.97 
II. THE ROUTE TEST: THE PRO BA TE EXCEPTION 
(AS ABSTENTION) IN ACTION 
Even accepting that the probate exception is best understood as a cate­
gory of abstention doctrine, it is not readily apparent how courts should 
apply this understanding. This Part argues that courts should apply the route 
test to determine the boundaries of the probate exception. Section II.A ar­
gues that the route test best reflects the historical background out of which 
the probate exception developed. Section 11.B contends that the route test is 
most consistent with the Erie doctrine. Section II.C argues that the route test 
best incorporates the prudential justifications for the probate exception. Sec­
tion II.D discusses how courts applying the route test can appropriately limit 
expansion or contraction of the probate exception. 
A. Historical Background 
The probate exception's historical background supports applying the 
route test to determine the boundaries of the exception. First, the practice of 
English courts in the years and decades before 1789 was similar to the route 
test. By definition, courts of law and equity did not hear matters over which 
ecclesiastical courts exercised exclusive jurisdiction. But more tellingly, 
courts of law and equity looked to the remedies within the power of ecclesi­
astical courts in determining whether to hear a given matter. As one 
Supreme Court case summarized the practice of English courts, "where a 
remedy is within the power of the ecclesiastical court ... a court of equity 
will not interfere . . .. It will only act in cases where the [ecclesiastical] 
court can furnish no adequate remedy."98 The route test appropriately mirrors 
English court practice, as the Supreme Court's "longstanding application of 
[abstention] doctrines reflects 'the common-law background against which 
the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted.' "99 
Second, early Supreme Court cases reflected the Court's willingness to 
allow the probate exception to evolve, as the route test allows it to. The 
Court repeatedly affirmed the flexible nature of the probate exception in 
general terms.100 More specifically, the Court itself shepherded the early evo­
lution of the exception, expanding it to encompass administration of estates 
and probate of wills of both real and personal property as states gave exclu-
97. See supra notes 3 1-45 and accompanying text. 
98. /11 re Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 5 1 2  (1875). 
99. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 1 7  U.S. 706, 7 1 7  (1996) (quoting New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 ( 1989)). 
1 00. See supra notes 67-7 1 ,  76 and accompanying text. 
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sive jurisdiction over those matters to their probate courts 101 and declaring 
that states could limit the scope of the exception by limiting the jurisdiction 
of their probate courts.102 Professor Nicolas's test would freeze the evolution 
of the probate exception at 1 789/03 requiring the Supreme Court to overrule 
centuries of precedent. The nature-of-the-claim test would largely freeze the 
evolution of the exception at the mid-nineteenth century-when the Court 
firmly established that federal courts could not probate a will or administer 
an estate 104 -allowing only technical changes in probate and administration 
to affect the scope of the probate exception.105 The route test allows the evo­
lution of the probate exception to continue as states modify the jurisdiction 
of their probate courts. 
The route test's ability to allow the probate exception to evolve is readily 
apparent in a recent example of the exception's evolution. Though courts 
applying the nature-of-the-claim test have flatly stated that "[t]he probate 
exception . . . does not apply to trusts, "106 others have recognized the simi­
larities trusts have with wills and estates and the growing use of trusts as 
will substitutes.107 Apparently uniquely among the states, Michigan decided, 
as one court put it, "that trusts . . . are so similar to and interrelated with 
wills and estates as to be placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the pro­
bate courts . . . .  "108 Courts applying the route test have respected this step in 
1 0  I .  See supra notes 64--66 and accompanying text. 
1 02. See Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 1 0, 21 ( 1 876) ("But that [probate] jurisdiction may be 
vested in the State courts of equity by statute is there recognized, and that, when so vested, the Fed­
eral courts, sitting in the States where such statutes exist, will also entertain concurrent jurisdiction 
in a case between proper parties."). 
1 03. Nicolas, supra note 16, at 1547 ("If the federal courts will not reconsider the historical 
gloss on the diversity statute, they should actually follow eighteenth-century English practice, which 
as demonstrated in this Article allowed the courts of equity and common law to exercise jurisdiction 
over a great deal of probate-related matters, including any suit related to trusts, wills of land, and 
even some challenges to the validity of wills."). 
1 04. By 1 876, the Supreme Court had established that federal courts could not probate a will 
or administer an estate. See, e.g., Fuentes, 92 U.S. at 25 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("This court has in 
repeated instances expressly said that the probate of wills and the administration of estates do not 
belong to the jurisdiction of the Federal courts under the grant of jurisdiction contained in the Judi­
ciary Act . . . .  "). 
1 05. See supra notes 1 9-2 1 ,  87-89 and accompanying text. 
1 06. Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Barnes v. Bran­
drup, 506 F. Supp. 396, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 198 1 ). 
1 07. See Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971 ,  974 n.2 (7th Cir. 1 988) ("The plaintiffs argue that 
the probate exception is inapplicable here because this action relates to the execution of an inter 
vivos trust, not to a will. We reject such a per se rule. The inter vivos trust is clearly a will substi­
tute."); Brege v. Merrill Lynch Trust Co., No. 04-7 1616, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2004). 
1 08. Brege, No. 04-71616, at 5. Mich. Comp. Laws § 700. 1302 (2004) provides: 
The [probate] court has exclusive legal and equitable jurisdiction of all of the following: 
(b) A proceeding that concerns the validity, internal affairs, or settlement of a trust; the ad­
ministration, distribution, modification, reformation, or termination of a trust; or the 
declaration of rights that involve a trust, trustee, or trust beneficiary, including, but not 
limited to, proceedings to do all of the following: 
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the evolution o f  probate law and the probate exception, holding that federal 
courts in Michigan may not hear claims involving the administration of 
trusts.109 Courts applying the nature-of-the-claim test or Professor Nicolas 's 
test would simply hold that matters involving trusts are not within the pro­
bate exception unless they affect the probate of a will or administration of 
an estate, with no regard for how the use and application of trusts, wills, and 
estates have changed over time nor for how states have responded to those 
changes. 
Finally, despite Supreme Court language seemingly to the contrary, 
courts applying the route test may look to state law without running afoul of 
early precedents. A number of early Supreme Court probate exception cases 
repeated the maxim that state laws have no bearing on the limits of federal 
jurisdiction. 1 1 0  In other cases, however, the Court expanded the scope of the 
probate exception at the same time and to the same extent as states ex­
panded the exclusive jurisdiction of their probate courts.1 1 1  With a proper 
understanding of the probate exception as abstention, courts and commenta­
tors can square this conflict. Federal courts do not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over only a very narrow range of probate-related matters under 
the jurisdictional grant of the Judiciary Act of 1 789,1 1 2  but federal court ab­
stention has given rise to a probate exception with wider boundaries.1 1 3 
Thus, courts may properly consider state law in applying the route test to 
decide whether to abstain under the probate exception, just as courts look to 
state law in deciding whether to abstain in traditional abstention contexts.1 14 
B. The Erie Doctrine 
The Erie doctrine, a relatively recent development, also supports apply­
ing the route test. The Erie doctrine requires that federal courts sitting 
in diversity apply state law 1 1 5 -but only substantive law, not state 
(i) Appoint or remove a trustee. 
(ii) Review the fees of a trustee. 
(iii) Require, hear, and settle interim or final accounts. 
(iv) Ascertain beneficiaries. (v) Determine a question that arises in the administration 
or distribution of a trust, including a question of construction of a will or trust. 
(vi) Instruct a trustee and determine relative to a trustee the existence or nonexistence 
of an immunity, power, privilege, duty, or right. 
(vii) Release registration of a trust. 
(viii) Determine an action or proceeding that involves settlement of an irrevocable trust. 
1 09. Lepard v. NBD Bank, 384 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2004); Brege, No. 04-7 1 6 1 6, at 5. 
1 1 0. See, e.g., Hess v. Reynolds, 1 1 3 U.S. 73, 77 ( 1 885); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
425, 429-30 ( 1 868). 
1 1 1 . See supra notes 63-7 1 and accompanying text. 
1 1 2.  See Nicolas, supra note 1 6, at 1 547; infra notes 1 26-132 and accompanying text. 
1 1 3.  See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
1 1 4. See supra notes 3 1 -37, 44 and accompanying text. 
1 1 5 .  See Erie R.R. v .  Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 ( 1 938). 
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procedure.1 1 6 The Supreme Court has held that in characterizing a rule as 
substantive or procedural, courts should rely on whether the difference 
would be "outcome-determinative" to the point of encouraging forum shop­
ping.1 11 A state court of general jurisdiction applying state law would dismiss 
claims over which state probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction, and a 
state probate court would dismiss claims over which it does not have juris­
diction. Federal courts that do not use the route test may allow a plaintiff to 
bring a collection of claims to federal court that he or she could only bring 
in two separate state courts-a state court of general jurisdiction and a state 
probate court would each dismiss some of the claims in such a collection. In 
this situation, the federal court rule is outcome-determinative to the point of 
encouraging forum shopping when compared to the practice of either state 
court. Federal courts that apply the route test avoid this problem entirely by 
mimicking the practice of state courts of general jurisdiction. 
Even a narrower reading of the Erie doctrine supports applying the route 
test. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and its progeny rejected uniformity across 
the federal system in diversity suits in favor of uniformity between federal 
and state courts. 1 1 8 The route test strongly supports uniformity between fed­
eral and state courts. In contrast, the nature-of-the-claim test and, to a lesser 
extent, Professor Nicolas's test remain at least partially premised on the de­
sire for uniformity across the federal system in probate exception diversity 
cases, 1 19 a desire which runs contrary to the main thrust of Erie . 
C. Prudential Justifications 
The route test also best incorporates the prudential justifications for the 
probate exception. Those justifications include comity, relative expertise, 
judicial economy, and legal certainty. 120 The route test is both consistent with 
1 16. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). 
1 17 .  See id. at 468--{)9. 
1 18. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75 (stating that pre-Erie practice "rendered impossible equal pro­
tection of the law. In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, the 
doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the State"); see also Guar. 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 1 09 ( 1 945) ("[l]n all cases where a federal court is exercising juris­
diction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in 
the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a 
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 3 1 3  U.S. 
487, 496 ( 1 94 1 )  ("Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state, 
upon which the Tompkins decision is based."). 
1 19. See Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 ( 1 868) ("The equity jurisdiction conferred 
on the Federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses; is subject 
to neither limitation or restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the different States of 
the Union."); Nicolas, supra note 1 6, at 1541-42. 
1 20. See Brege v. Merril l  Lynch Trust Co., No. 04-7 1 6 1 6, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 
2004) ("The development of the exception since Markham reflects respect for state specialty court 
jurisdiction and primary regard for practical concerns such as legal certainty, judicial economy, and 
relative expertise of courts.") (citing Turja v. Turja, 1 18 F.3d 1006, 1 009 (4th Cir. 1997), McKibben 
v. Chubb, 840 F.2d 1 525, 1 529 ( 10th Cir. 1988), and Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 7 1 2, 714-1� (7th 
Cir. 1 982)). 
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the prudential justifications and indicates how to weigh them properly in a 
given case.1 21 In contrast, the nature-of-the-claim test and Professor Nico­
las 's test eschew the prudential justifications for the probate exception in 
favor of their preferred historical analyses.1 22 And though the practical test 
explicitly incorporates the prudential justifications, judges applying it are 
left to sort out how to weigh the justifications on their own. 123 The route test 
is the only test that provides a reliable and objective method for incorporat­
ing and weighing the prudential justifications for the probate exception. 
D. Limits 
Of course, the route test has the potential to greatly expand or contract 
the scope of the probate exception as states expand or contract the scope of 
their probate courts' exclusive jurisdiction. Federal courts should appropri­
ately limit expansion of the exception, even while applying the route test. 
Using the route test and comity as first principles, a court should presume 
that a matter is appropriately within the probate exception if it falls within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the state probate courts, trusting that the state 
has made reasoned decisions about its courts.124 But if it is clear that a state 
has instead attempted to shield a matter from federal court review, for ex­
ample, the federal court should not blindly follow the route test. Courts 
should continue to look to the scope of traditional probate jurisdiction and 
the prudential justifications for the exception in determining whether a mat­
ter newly within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state probate court is 
sufficiently probate-related to fall within the exception.1 25 And understand­
ing the probate exception as a category of abstention doctrine, federal courts 
retain an appropriate measure of flexibility to hear a case when the circum­
stances do not warrant abstention, flexibility that courts do not have in 
administering rigid jurisdictional rules. 
Likewise, federal courts can and should reserve certain probate matters 
as exclusively for state courts. This is of special concern in states that have 
1 2 1 .  See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
1 22. See supra notes 1 9-2 1 ,  28 and accompanying text. 
1 23. Cf Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941 ,  944 (7th Cir. 2003) (identifying legal certainty as a 
practical justification for the probate exception, "albeit not the strongest one"). 
1 24. Cf Brege, No. 04-7 1 6 1 6, at 5 ("Michigan has decided that trusts, whether or not inter 
vivas, are so similar to and interrelated with wills and estates as to be placed under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the probate courts; this Court will respect that decision and remand this matter under 
the probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction."). 
1 25. See, e.g., Brege, No. 04-7 1 6 1 6, at 3-5. The Brege court first noted that Michigan had 
granted its probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of trusts and detailed the 
prudential justifications for the probate exception. Id. The court reasoned that Michigan had rea­
sonably decided that matters involving trusts were "similar to and interrelated with" matters 
involving wills and estates. Id. at 5. The court stated that it would "respect that decision" in finding 
that the claims at issue fell within the probate exception. Id. 
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eliminated specialized probate courts. 126 The Supreme Court has acknowl­
edged that a state could significantly restrict the scope of the probate 
exception by vesting its courts of general jurisdiction with jurisdiction over 
probate matters, thereby giving concurrent jurisdiction over probate matters 
to federal courts sitting in diversity. 1 21 Other principles, however, set bounds 
on the extent to which states can cede power over probate matters to federal 
courts. First, a federal court has no jurisdiction over a matter that does not 
constitute a case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 128 
The actual probate of a will or administration of an estate often does not 
involve an Article III case or controversy.12 9 Second, a federal court may not 
hear in rem or quasi in rem claims, such as . certain matters involving trusts, 
wills, and estates, if in rem or quasi in rem claims concerning the same 
property are already pending before a competent state court. 1 3° Finally, a 
federal court may have no power to hear a claim or discretion to refuse to 
hear it under traditional principles of abstention 1 3 1  and equity. 1 32 
Furthermore, because of its statutory and prudential bases, Congress has 
the power to expand or contract the scope of the probate exception by stat­
ute. Presently, Congress limits the exception via statutory grants of 
jurisdiction to the federal courts over specific matters, superseding other 
statutory limits and overriding any court-created prudential concerns. For 
example, the Markham Court decided that federal courts should not abstain 
in the probate exception case at hand in part because a substantive Congres­
sional statute formed the basis for federal jurisdiction. 1 33 Thus, the probate 
1 26. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art VI, § 9 ("Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to 
redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office. 
Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law."); Dragan 
v. Miller, 679 F.2d 7 12, 7 1 5  (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that Illinois eliminated specialized probate 
courts). 
1 27. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 21 ( 1 876) ("But that [probate] jurisdiction may be vested 
in the State courts of equity by statute is there recognized, and that, when so vested, the Federal 
courts, sitting in the States where such statutes exist, will also entertain concurrent jurisdiction in a 
case between proper parties."). 
1 28. u.s. CoNsT. art. m, § 2. 
1 29. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 496-97 ( 1 883); Fuentes, 92 U.S. at 2 1-22; Nicolas, supra 
note 16, at 1 545. 
1 30. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 4 1 2  ( 1 964); Nicolas, supra note 1 6, at 1 526-
27. See generally 30 Am Jur 2d, Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 1 9 1  (2005). 
1 3 1 .  See, e.g., supra notes 3 1-45 and accompanying text. 
1 32. See, e.g. , Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 17 U.S. 706, 7 1 7  ( 1 996) ("[A] federal court 
has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it 'is asked to employ its historic powers 
as a court of equity' . . . .  ") (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 
100, 1 20 ( 1 98 1 )  (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
1 33. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 492, 496 ( 1 946); cf Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 ( 1983) (stating that the existence of a federal question weighs 
heavily against abstention). 
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exception properly applies only to diversity cases, 134 and Congress has the 
power to further alter the scope of the exception, within the limits set by the 
U.S. Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite criticism, the probate exception has endured in the U.S. federal 
court system for over two hundred years. Looking back, we can now see 
that the probate exception fits remarkably well within another widely­
criticized doctrine developed by the federal courts-abstention doctrine. 
The two doctrines are built on similar practices and prudential justifications, 
practices and justifications that extend from eighteenth century England 
through modem America. 
Federal courts should apply the route test to determine the boundaries of 
the probate exception. The route test best reflects the proper understanding 
of the probate exception as a category of abstention doctrine, as well as the 
historical and modem practices and justifications for the probate exception. 
While applying the route test, courts still have the ability to appropriately 
limit expansion and contraction of the probate exception without violating 
the underlying prudential justifications for the exception. 
1 34. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1 02.92 [ 1 ]  (3d ed. 
2005) (explaining the probate exception as a limitation on federal diversity jurisdiction); Nicolas, 
supra note 1 6, at 1 539-40. But see Marshall v. Marshall, 392 F.3d l l 1 8, 1 131 -32 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that courts generally refer to the probate exception as a limit on diversity jurisdiction, but 
holding that the exception limited the court's federal question jurisdiction). 
